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FAIRNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW:  
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON 
Ilanah Fhima† 
Fairness stands at the crossroads of copyright law. The concept 
of fairness—which seeks to balance the interests of copyright owners 
and users as well as the needs of the public in receiving information—
is present in the copyright exceptions in both the U.S. and the U.K. The 
U.S. and U.K. adopt different approaches to how the defenses should 
be structured, with the U.S. having an open list of which types of use 
can benefit, leaving this for judges to develop in response to specific 
fact patterns and changing conditions before them. On the other hand, 
the U.K. has a list, pre-determined by British Parliament, of which uses 
can benefit. 
Both use the notion of fairness to moderate between different 
interests at stake, and much of this piece is devoted to documenting 
how the factors used to determine whether use is fair are in fact very 
similar. However, it is argued that the open-versus-closed list 
approach does make a big difference to the likely outcomes in the 
jurisdictions—giving U.S. courts the license to privilege the type of use 
over the countervailing interests of the copyright owner in a way that 
is just not available to U.K. judges.  
 
  
																																								 																				
† Reader in Intellectual Property Law, Co-director, Institute of Brand and Innovation Law, 
Faculty of Laws, University College London. Email: i.fhima@ucl.ac.uk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fairness stands at the crossroads of copyright law. The concept of 
fairness—which seeks to balance the interests of copyright owners and 
users as well as the needs of the public in receiving information—is 
present in the copyright exceptions in both the U.S. and the U.K. The 
U.S. and U.K. adopt different approaches to how the defenses should 
be structured, with the U.S. having an open list of which types of use 
can benefit, leaving this for judges to develop in response to specific 
fact patterns and changing conditions before them. On the other hand, 
the U.K. has a list, pre-determined by the British Parliament, of which 
uses can benefit. Ultimately, all use the notion of fairness to moderate 
between different interests at stake, and most of this piece is devoted 
to documenting how the factors used to determine whether use is fair 
are in fact very similar, and the evidence used to determine whether 
they are made out is also very similar.1 However, it will be argued that 
the open-versus-closed list approach does make a big difference to the 
likely outcomes in the jurisdictions, by giving U.S. courts the license 
to privilege the type of use over the countervailing interests of the 
copyright owner in a way that is just not open to U.K. judges. 
Consequently, judges in the U.K. pay more attention to the other factors 
																																								 																				
 1. For a similar argument in the Canadian context, see Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing 
Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing 
and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309 (2008). 
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which, although largely common to the U.S., are applied more strictly 
against second users of copyright works on the side of the Atlantic. 
I. OVERVIEW OF FAIR USE/DEALING  
This section describes the structure of the fairness defenses in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. It also explains some of the 
external instruments that shape those defenses. Both jurisdictions have 
defenses to trademark infringement, which allow third-party use of 
copyright work deemed to be “fair.”2 However, the way in which these 
defenses are structured differs such that one potentially leads to 
differences in the substantive result when compared to the other. 
A. The United States 
The fair use defense in the United States is found in 17 U.S.C. § 
107, which codifies prior jurisprudence on this issue. Section 107 
reads:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [the 
infringement provisions], the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration 
of all the above factors.3 
																																								 																				
 2. It should be noted though that, additionally, all three jurisdictions have defenses for 
discrete forms of desirable use, such as use by libraries or educational establishments, which are 
subject to different conditions.  
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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The defense is commonly thought of as an “open” defense, in the 
sense that it does not contain any limitation as to the type of use that 
can benefit from the defense, as long as the use is “fair.”4 While a list 
of typical situations where the defense might apply is provided, this is 
illustrative only, and even when a use fits in to one of these categories, 
it will still need to be shown that the use is “fair.” This determination 
is guided by the list of factors given, though this list is not exhaustive. 
The list does not prescribe the relative weight to be given to each of 
these factors, although the courts have indicated their relative 
importance in an evolving jurisprudence that will be discussed below. 
B. The United Kingdom 
The U.K. is often described as having a “closed list” of fairness-
type defenses.5 The mere fact that a third-party use is arguably fair does 
not amount to a defense in the U.K. It must first be established that the 
use is one of those listed in the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988 
(hereinafter “CDPA”). These are “research and private study,”6, 
“criticism, review and news reporting,”7 “illustration for instruction,”8 
and the newly-added “caricature, parody or pastiche”9 and “quotation 
exception.”10 Even if use is for one of the stated purposes, the third 
party must then go on to show that the way in which he has used the 
copyright work amounts to “fair dealing.” The terminology of “fair 
dealing” has been present in U.K. copyright legislation since 1911.11 
Fair dealing is not defined in the CDPA and, as such, is left to judicial 
interpretation, which in turn draws on pre-1988 jurisprudence.12 A 
particularly influential definition which has been used as a starting 
																																								 																				
 4. This approach is described in Emily Hudson, Implementing Fair Use in Copyright 
Law: Lessons from Australia, 25 INTELL. PROP. J. 201, 211 (2013), although ultimately, she argues 
against it.  
 5. See id. at 211. It should be noted that there are a large number of other defenses which 
are included in the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 31-76 (U.K.). These set out 
specific conditions that apply to each of the different types of uses.  
 6. Id. at § 29(1). 
 7. Id. at § 30(1). 
 8. Id. at § 32. 
 9. Id. at § 30A.   
 10. Id. at § 30(1ZA). 
 11. Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (U.K.). 
 12. For an account of the development of fair dealing post-1911, see Jonathan Griffiths, 
Preserving Judicial Freedom of Movement – Interpreting Fair Dealing in Copyright Law, 2 
INTELL. PROP. Q. 164 (2000) and Alexandra Sims, Strangling Their Creation: the Courts' 
Treatment of Fair Dealing in Copyright Law Since 1911, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 192 (2010). Looking 
further back, see Melissa De Zwart, A Historical Analysis of the Birth of Fair Dealing and Fair 
Use: Lessons for the Digital Age, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 60 (2007) and Alexandra Sims, Appellations 
of Piracy: Fair Dealing’s Prehistory, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 3 (2011). 
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point by many courts is found in Hubbard v. Vosper, where Lord 
Denning noted: 
It is impossible to define what is “fair dealing.” It must be a 
question of degree. You must consider first the number and 
extent of the quotations and extracts. Are they altogether too 
many and too long to be fair? Then you must consider the use 
made of them. If they are used as a basis for comment, 
criticism or review, that may be fair dealing. If they are used 
to convey the same information as the author, for a rival 
purpose, that may be unfair. Next, you must consider the 
proportions. To take long extracts and attach short comments 
may be unfair. But, short extracts and long comments may be 
fair. Other considerations may come to mind also.13  
Although ordered differently, it is possible to discern in this 
statement the various factors mentioned in § 107. The type of use is 
mentioned (as per the first U.S. factor), the amount taken is mentioned 
(the third U.S. factor) and whether the use conveys the same 
information as the author could be seen as a form of market harm (the 
fourth U.S. factor). However, in this article, we will examine whether 
the same relative weight is given to each factor in the two jurisdictions. 
II.  THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE 
Significant elements of U.K. copyright law have fallen under the 
harmonization regime of the European Union, and the exceptions to 
copyright are no exception. Article 5 of the Information Society 
Directive14 (hereinafter “the InfoSoc Directive”) requires Member 
States to have certain exceptions. Outside of those exceptions, it 
provides an exhaustive list of fifteen other instances in which Member 
States can recognize defenses to copyright infringement in Article 5(3). 
Those which are closest to the fair dealing defenses in the U.K. are:  
(a) use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or 
scientific research, as long as the source, including the 
author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be 
impossible and to the extent justified by the non-
commercial purpose to be achieved; 
 . . .  
																																								 																				
 13. Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (Eng.). 
 14. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16-17 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. There is a pending proposal 
to adapt certain of these exceptions to meet the needs of the digital era. See Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016). 
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(c) reproduction by the press, communication to the public or 
making available of published articles on current economic, 
political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other 
subject-matter of the same character, in cases where such use 
is not expressly reserved, and as long as the source, including 
the author’s name, is indicated, or use of works or other 
subject-matter in connection with the reporting of current 
events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose and 
as long as the source, including the author’s name, is 
indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible; 
(d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, 
provided that they relate to a work or other subject-matter 
which has already been lawfully made available to the public, 
that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source, 
including the author’s name, is indicated, and that their use is 
in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by 
the specific purpose; 
. . .  
(k) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche[.]15 
Additionally, Article 5(5) requires that any copyright exemption 
must be compliant with the three-step test,16 i.e., they “shall only be 
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”  
The CJEU, in interpreting these provisions in Infopaq17 has held 
that the exceptions detailed in the InfoSoc Directive must be construed 
narrowly, in accordance with the general European principle that a 
provision of a directive which derogates from a general principle within 
the directive must be interpreted narrowly.18 This has led to concerns 
about the restrictiveness of post-InfoSoc-Directive user rights,19 
though others have argued that a careful reading reveals flexibilities in 
how the considerable number of enumerated exceptions can be 
applied.20 In the recent Deckmyn decision, the Court has suggested that 
																																								 																				
 15. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5(3). 
 16. The three-step test is discussed in more detail below. 
 17. Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-6569. 
 18. Id. at ¶ 56. 
 19. See, e.g., Jonathan Griffiths et al., The European Copyright Society’s “Opinion on the 
Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn,” 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 127, 129 
(2015). 
 20. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of 
Flexibilities (Amsterdam Law Sch. Research Paper No. 2012-39; Inst. for Info. Law Research 
Paper No. 2012-33, 2012). 
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it is willing to take an approach that involves a “balancing” of the 
parties’ rights.21 
The relationship between U.K. copyright law in this area and the 
InfoSoc Directive is a complex one. Key cases either predate or are 
roughly contemporaneous with the entry into force of the Directive. 
For the most part, it seems to have been assumed implicitly that the 
U.K. defenses are compliant, and where they were not, legislative 
amendments have been made. Moreover, at the judicial level, it is 
argued that the cases described below display a relatively strict 
approach to the defenses anyway, and the need to consider fair dealing 
gives an entry-point for the considerations embodied in the three-step 
test. However, in English and Wales Cricket Board Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. 
(“ECB v. Tixdaq”),22 Arnold J. has given a far more prominent and 
direct role to the InfoSoc Directive and has suggested that domestic 
authorities must be “treated with a degree of caution,” since they 
largely pre-date the Directive and do not consider the three-step test. 
III.  THE THREE-STEP TEST 
At a higher level, the outer limits of any fair dealing/use rule, is 
the three-step test. The test, found in various international copyright 
instruments,23 and the InfoSoc Directive,24 requires that all exceptions 
to copyright be limited to (1) certain special cases; (2) which do not 
conflict with the normal exploitation of a work; and (3) which do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. It has 
been argued that an open-ended fair use defense does not comply with 
the first step. In a stroke of irony, the Israeli transition from fair dealing 
to open-ended fair use was challenged on this basis by the U.S.25 
However, the U.S. defense has not been challenged on this basis,26 and 
as our discussion has shown, which the defense is in principle open-
ended, the U.S. judiciary has construed the indicative guidance given 
in § 107 in a way that recognizes the needs of copyright holders as well 
as users. Thus, the Australian Law Reform Commission, in Copyright 
and the Digital Economy, when considering the introduction of an 
																																								 																				
 21. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, C-201/13, 2014 E.C.J. 458 at [26]-[27], [34].   
 22. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [53]-[72] (Eng.). 
 23. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), art. 13; WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, art. 10; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 16(2).  
 24. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5(5). 
 25. See Meera Nair, Canada and Israel: Cultivating Fairness of Use 11-12 (Am. U. 
Washington Co. of L. PIJIP Research, Paper No. 2012-04, 2012). 
 26. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy, Discussion 
Paper No. 79 (2013) ¶ 4.147.  
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open-ended fair use provision, came to the conclusion that there was 
no conflict with the three-step test.27 
The three-step test has been brought more directly into play in the 
U.K. by its inclusion in Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive.28 It has 
also been considered briefly by Arnold J. in ECB v. Tixdaq.29 The 
general tenor of that decision is that fair dealing for the purposes of 
reporting current events (the basis before the court) was consistent with 
the test. It remains to be seen whether this decision heralds the 
(arguably surprising)30 beginning of more frequent references to the 
three-step test in determining whether a defendant’s use of another’s 
copyright work was necessary. At the European level, Article 5(5) has 
been interpreted by the CJEU in Infopaq31 as requiring a strict 
interpretation of the copyright defenses, which would narrow the 
situations in which it could be considered necessary to use another’s 
work. However, Griffiths has suggested that the CJEU may be stepping 
back from this approach at least in certain contexts with the 
introduction of the concept of a “fair balance” in Deckmyn.32 
IV. THE FAIRNESS FACTORS 
This section considers the key factors used in determining 
whether use is “fair.” 
A. The Purpose and Character of the Use 
The purpose and character of the use is the first factor in the § 107 
test. However, in the U.K., the statute limits the types of uses that can 
benefit from the fair dealing defenses to “research and private study,”33 
“criticism, review and news reporting,”34 and the newly added 
																																								 																				
 27. Id. at ¶¶ 4.138-4.149. 
 28. “The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be 
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or 
other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.” 
InfoSoc Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5(5). 
 29. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [88]-[92] (Eng.). 
 30. Because of the general reluctance of courts to directly apply international instruments 
in the normal course of events, see Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and 
National Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 424-25, 430 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 
4th ed. 2014).  
 31. Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-6569. 
 32. Jonathan Griffiths, Fair Dealing After Deckmyn—the United Kingdom’s Defense for 
Caricature, Parody or Pastiche, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT (Megan Richardson & Sam Ricketson eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g 
2017). See also Sabine Jacques, Are National Courts Required to Have an (Exceptional) 
European Sense of Humour?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 134, 137 (2015). 
 33. Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 29(1) (Eng.). 
 34. Id. at § 30(1). 
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“caricature, parody or pastiche,”35 and “quotation.”36 Having a closed 
list of defenses that can be justified by fair use places responsibility in 
the hands of the legislator to pre-empt the kinds of uses which should 
be permissible. This stands in contrast to the U.S. position, where the 
types of use that can be fair have been left open and consequently have 
been developed by the judges. It is hard to say which is the more 
desirable approach—while the closed list can give a degree of 
certainty,37 it can also stifle innovation and the development of new 
technologies. Technologies which are not foreseen will not be included 
in the closed list. The then-U.K. Prime Minister, David Cameron, on 
announcing the Hargreaves Review, noted that the founders of Google 
had stated that they could not have started their company in the U.K. 
because: 
our copyright system is not as friendly to this sort of 
innovation as it is in the United States. Over there, they have 
what are called “fair-use” provisions, which some people 
believe gives companies more breathing space to create new 
products and services.38  
While this is, to a degree, speculation, it is certainly the case that 
the Google Books litigation39 would never have got off the ground in 
the U.K. because the use does not fall within any of the categories 
listed.40 Ultimately, the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals decided 
that the scanning of the entire text of copyright-protected books to 
enable functionality for internet users to search for specific words or 
snippets of text was a transformative use that augmented public 
knowledge without providing substitutes for the copyright works and 
so fitted within the fair use defense.41 
																																								 																				
 35. Id. at § 30A.   
 36. Id. at § 30(IZA). 
 37. But see Hudson, supra note 4, (arguing that the dichotomy of “closed list = rules = 
certainty” versus “open list = standards = flexibility” may be overstated).  
 38. UK Copyright Laws to be Reviewed, Announces Cameron, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://bit.do/BBC_UK-Copyright-Laws.  
 39. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 40. Perhaps the closest analogy is The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. Meltwater 
Holding BV [2011] EWCA (Civ) 890, [36]-[41] (Eng.), which involved “scraping” news websites 
in order to communicate relevant articles to the commercial monitoring organization’s clients. 
Just five paragraphs were devoted to fair dealing, in a treatment that The Chancellor himself 
describes as “cursory”. Ultimately, the use was found to be neither criticism or review, nor news 
reporting with no discussion of any potential benefits from such use of technology. A comparison 
with England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 (Eng.) is also 
possible, since both are online platforms providing functionality in areas where the copyright 
holder had not serviced the potential market.  
 41. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 202. 
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Moreover, even if a technology or third-party use of a copyright 
work is identified as socially desirable, it may take many years and 
numerous legislative attempts for it to be allowed into the “closed list.” 
The parody defense is a case in point: parodies can hardly be described 
as new technologies,42 and yet it took eight years from the 
recommendation to introduce a parody defense in the Gowers Review 
in 200643 to its actual entry in to force in 2014.44 By contrast, in the 
U.S., the Supreme Court was able to class parody as fair use when faced 
with the appropriate factual pattern in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.45   
The U.S. fair use provision leaves it to the judges to interpret 
which types of use fall within the fair use defense. A number of 
illustrative examples are given, which includes various types of use 
subject to a fair dealing defense in the U.K. However, such uses are not 
presumptively fair, and still need to be shown to satisfy the four fair 
use factors to the satisfaction of the courts.  
Instead, perhaps the greatest impact in recent years on the fair use 
defense has been from the first factor, “the purpose and character of the 
use.” In particular, judges have considered whether the use is 
“transformative.”46 The language of transformative use is not found 
either within the legislation or, indeed, the legislative history. Instead, 
it owes its origins to an article written by Second Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals Judge Pierre Leval, writing extra-judicially in 1990.47 He 
argues: 
																																								 																				
 42. Its origins have been traced back to ancient Greece. See Eileen Gredley & Spyros 
Maniatis, Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody and its Treatment in 
Copyright, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339 (1997). 
 43. ANDREW GOWERS, THE GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68 (Dec. 
2006). A parody exception was again recommended in IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL 
OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 51 (May 2011). 
 44. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations 2014 
SI 2014/2356 (Eng.). 
 45. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Although it should be noted that 
the question of whether parody was fair use was put to the Supreme Court in the 1950s in Benny 
v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), the Court was split and did not reach a conclusion—
highlighting the risk of uncertainty that can arise from deciding such issues judicially—which can 
ultimately also have a chilling effect. Moreover, this argument rests on the assumption that the 
judiciary will be willing to take a flexible approach to expanding the reach of fair use. ROBERT 
BURRELL & ALISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT, 253-67 (2005). 
Historically, the U.K. judiciary has repeatedly failed to exercise flexibilities open to them and has 
instead narrowed the potential scope of the fairness defenses. Id. 
 46. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
715, 745 (2011) (explaining that once use is found to be transformative, then that determination 
shapes a court’s analysis of the other factors). 
 47. See the account in Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms 
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 550 (2004). But see the discussion 
of productive use in Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: the Productive Use Factor in Fair 
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Factor One—The Purpose and Character of the Secondary 
Use. 
Factor One’s direction that we “consider[] …. the purpose and 
character of the use” raises the question of justification. Does 
the use fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate 
creativity for public illumination? This question is vitally 
important to the fair use inquiry, and lies at the heart of the 
fair user’s case. Recent judicial opinions have not sufficiently 
recognized its importance. 
 
In analyzing a fair use defense, it is not sufficient simply to 
conclude whether or not justification exists. The question 
remains how powerful, or persuasive, is the justification, 
because the court must weigh the strength of the secondary 
user’s justification against factors favoring the copyright 
owner. I believe the answer to the question of justification 
turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged 
use is transformative. The use must be productive and must 
employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a 
different purpose from the original. A quotation of 
copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes 
the original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story’s 
words, it would merely “supersede the objects” of the 
original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value 
to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new 
aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very 
type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for 
the enrichment of society.48 
Judge Leval’s approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,49 a case involving a parody of Roy Orbison’s 
“Oh, Pretty Woman.”50 After noting that the wording of § 107 makes 
it clear that what is needed is a case-by-case (and hence implicitly 
judicially led) analysis, Justice Souter found that: 
																																								 																				
Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 702-22 (1994).  
 48. Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).  
 49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79. 
 50. While the original describes a pretty woman, in the defendants’ version, she is replaced 
by a hairy woman and a bald-headed woman—both ladies of the night. In the words of Judge 
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[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice 
Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supersede[s] 
the objects” of the original creation, Folsom v. Marsh, supra, 
at 348; accord, Harper & Row, supra, 471 U.S., at 562 
(“supplanting” the original), or instead adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
“transformative.”51  
This shifted the focus from where it had hitherto been, on the effect on 
the market for the copyright work, to whether the secondary use created 
a “new” work which was socially desirable. This though is a subjective 
question, which implies a level of unpredictability, or “murkiness” as 
Sag describes it.52 This may in turn have a chilling effect on the 
development of new uses, given the uncertainty as to whether any 
particular use will be found to be transformative. Scholars have argued 
that it also privileges a particular kind of secondary use, which alters 
the copyright work, potentially at the expense of uses which involve 
“pure copyright” for a socially-beneficial purpose, such as 
photocopying works for use in education.53 However, as has been 
discussed above, the freedom in deciding which uses are 
transformative does allow courts to be able to shield certain new 
technologies from the reach of copyright as in the Google Books 
litigation,54 or even to classify existing uses as socially beneficial and 
transformative and hence within the defense.55 
Additionally, in some circumstances at least, U.S. courts have 
taken a relatively liberal approach to what counts as transformative, 
concentrating on the context of the use in order to find third-party use 
which copies the entire original work without making any addition to 
be transformative. This is particularly visible in the search engine 
cases: in Perfect 10 v. Google,56 Google’s use of the entirety of the 
copyright owner’s images, albeit in “thumbnail” size was found to be 
transformative because “a search engine transforms the image into a 
pointer directing a user to a source of information”57 and “a search 
engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a 
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new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”58 While there is no 
doubt to the social utility of search engines, to class Google’s search 
engine as a “work” seems artificial and it takes an esoteric state of mind 
to consider the copyright images “transformed” in the way the court 
describes, adding to the general uncertainty about the meaning of 
transformative use.59 Similarly, in the Google Books litigation,60 the 
entire text of the books in question were copied, but the fact that the 
search engine allowed users to search for words in a specific work, or 
across a corpus of books,61 and to view those words in context of the 
text to determine whether the book was relevant to them, meant that 
the use was transformative.62 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit did not 
consider the arguably analogous creation of Napster to be a 
transformative use, characterizing Napster as a “retransmission.”63 
Arguably though, the platform could be viewed as a form of search 
engine for music. If one views these cases as situations in which 
copyright has intervened with an effect on the ability of third parties to 
develop novel technological platforms in fields that are not being fully 
exploited by the copyright owner, a U.K. parallel might be seen in ECB 
v. Tixdaq (which will be discussed further below), where it was found 
that the defendant’s development of an app that allowed users to upload 
eight-second clips was infringing and could not benefit from any of the 
fair dealing defenses.64  
B. The Effect on the Market for the Copyright Work 
The fact that the later use has or may have a negative impact on 
the market for the copyright work has often been used to limit the 
applicability of fair use/dealing. It is important to note at the outset that 
there can be various reasons why the market is damaged: (i) the second 
use may provide a direct substitute for the primary work; (ii) the second 
use may damage demand for the primary mark through criticizing it, 
e.g., a parody or critical review, and (iii) the second use may damage a 
derivative or potential unexploited market connected to the primary 
mark.  
The difficulty with this factor is that by definition, use that is 
critical of earlier work, or the ideas contained therein, will damage the 
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market for it and yet this use and the damage caused will be necessary 
to achieve the objective of the criticism. Arguably, the transformative 
use consideration makes this balance better by focusing on the nature 
and desirability of the second use, rather than the impact on the 
copyright work. Inevitably though, considering transformative use will 
implicate the impact on the market because a use which is a direct 
substitute for the copyright work will not be transformative because it 
has not added anything, but a use which had altered the original, albeit 
in a commercially-harmful way, can be transformative. Impact on 
licensing raises the vexed question of the extent to which creating a 
work is one market that should automatically give the author/owner the 
right to block innovations and uses in markets that it may not even have 
thought of entering, but where the use of its copyright work is 
necessary for the innovation to take place. 
The fourth factor in § 107 is “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” In Harpers & 
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court stated that 
this was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”65 
A year earlier the Supreme Court had explained the scope of the factor 
against the context that the commercial benefit of copyright is what 
incentives authors to produce,66 noting that:  
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work 
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that 
if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the 
potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual present 
harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the 
copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage. 
Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will 
result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm 
exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that 
likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial 
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.67 
The importance of this factor in the U.S. has arguable reduced 
considerably (particularly in relation to commercial uses) since the 
increased emphasis on transformative use under the first factor.68 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose limits the 
presumption that commercial use will be harmful to cases involving 
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“mere duplication.”69 However, harm to the market still forms part of 
the test, even after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, and so it is worth noting 
the breadth of the scope of harm that may contribute to a lack of 
fairness, taking in actual harm and future harm, seemingly at a 
relatively low level.  
In Harpers & Row,70 former U.S. President Ford had entered into 
an agreement with Harpers & Row and Reader’s Digest to publish, and 
also to serialize, his memoirs for a substantial sum. The Nation had 
managed to get ahold of an unpublished copy of the manuscript and 
published a 2,250 word article, which included 300 words verbatim 
from the original manuscript that included information regarding the 
Watergate scandal. The Nation claimed a justification based on the 
public interest in reporting current events, but this was rejected by the 
Supreme Court, which instead focused on the fact that, as a 
consequence of the publication of the “spoiler,” Time had cancelled its 
contract with Ford, and the associated payment, meaning that there was 
clear evidence of actual harm to the market.71 
There is an interesting parallel with the British Ashdown v. Daily 
Telegraph case.72 The Daily Telegraph had managed to obtain and 
publish a minute written by former leader of the Liberal Democrat 
party, Paddy Ashdown, which showed that discussions had taken place 
regarding a possible coalition between the Liberal Democrats and the 
Labour party. The minute formed part of his diaries which, after 
stepping down from the leadership, he had indicated he was 
considering publishing, although he had taken no formal steps to do so 
at the time of The Telegraph’s publication. After citing commentary by 
Laddie, Prescott, and Vittoria73 saying that the most important factor 
of the fair dealing analysis was whether the defendant was 
commercially competing with the copyright owner by providing a 
substitute for the probable purchase of an authorized copy,74 the Court 
of Appeal found that:  
the publication in the Sunday Telegraph destroyed a part of 
the value of the memoirs which it had been Mr. Ashdown’s 
intention to sell, and which he did, in fact, sell. Equally we are 
in no doubt that the extensive quotations of Mr. Ashdown’s 
own words added a flavor to the description of the events 
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covered which made the article more attractive to read and 
will have been of significant commercial value in enabling the 
Sunday Telegraph to maintain, if not to enhance, the loyalty 
of its readership.75 
This militated against fair dealing. What is striking in both cases is that 
the courts have privileged the copyright owners’ commercial interests 
over journalists’ perceptions regarding what is necessary to report 
current events in a credible fashion. While it may be true that the 
market for the memoir was damaged (although this was perhaps 
doubtful in itself, as otherwise copyright owners would not enter into 
serialization contracts) there is a latent assumption that there should be 
a right for those who have held high office to make money in a 
derivative memoir market by selectively releasing the “juicy” bits at a 
time that suits them. This is particularly visible in Ashdown, given that 
he had not even entered into a contract at the time and so suffered only 
potential harm. This right, it seems, overrides the right of the public to 
be informed about political activities in a credible fashion that, by using 
the actual words of the politician, carries the least risk of 
misinterpretation.  
Perhaps a more clear-cut case is ECB v. Tixdaq.76 The defendant 
marketed an app which allowed users to upload eight-second extracts 
of sporting events, including the claimant’s cricket matches, to be 
shared with the public online. While the English and Wales Cricket 
Board (“ECB”) engaged in substantial licensing activity, it did not offer 
at the time a standalone cricket clips service to members of the public. 
Nevertheless, the defendant’s use conflicted with the potential for the 
ECB to provide such a service in the future, and as such, complicated 
with normal exploiting of the copyright work in a way that militated 
against fair dealing.77  
In other cases though, the courts have taken a relatively robust 
view of whether damage to the market, or the likelihood thereof, has 
been proven. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Sony v. Betamax case involved 
the question of whether the use of video recorders to record from 
commercial television channels constituted fair use. As has been 
described above, the Supreme Court was prepared to place significant 
importance of the market harm factor. However, in this case it 
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concluded such harm was not proven, given that audience 
measurement technology was imprecise, and it was possible that 
copyright holders would actually benefit from such time-shifting, as it 
could enable a wider range of people to view the programs and 
surrounding advertising.78  
Similarly, in the U.K. case of Fraser-Woodward Ltd v. BBC,79 
Mann J. recognized harm to the commercial value of the copyright 
work as cognizable within the fair dealing analysis. However, in this 
case, the harm that was alleged was not made out. The case concerned 
the inclusion of Mr. Fraser’s photographs of the Beckham family in a 
television program questioning whether Victoria Beckham was 
manipulating the press, or vice versa. Mr. Fraser argued that if his 
photographs were included in the program, the mass exposure would 
“cripple” his ability to license them to newspapers. The judge appears 
to accept that such loss of licensing opportunity could be relevant to 
whether use is fair dealing, but he notes that “it does not follow that 
any damage or any risk makes any use of the material unfair.”80 In this 
case, the combination of the fact that Mr. Fraser had licensed others of 
his photographs to television programs, the fact that the use of the 
pictures was not “lingering” and that Mr. Fraser had not shown any 
actual damage, or a significant level of risk thereof, meant that relevant 
damage was not made out.81 
C. The Amount Taken from the Copyright Work 
Perhaps the trickiest part of the fair use test, and ostensibly the 
one that leaves the most discretion in the hands of users is the question 
of how much of the copyright work that it is fair to take. Rightly, this 
is a question that needs to be tackled on a case-by-case basis. This 
inherently leads to a degree of vagueness, as it is neither possible nor 
desirable for legislators or courts to preempt every instance of use in 
advance in formulating a test. Thus, in Hubbard v. Vosper,82 Lord 
Denning noted that “It is impossible to define what is ‘fair dealing.’ It 
must be a question of degree. . . . [A]fter all is said and done, it must 
be a matter of impression.” Similarly, (although admitted not just in 
connection with this factor) the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the 
legislative history behind § 107 “eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach 
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to fair use.”83 It is argued that this flexibility should be used in a way 
that gives a margin of appreciation to users. By the time this analysis 
is taking place, it had been established that the use of the copyright 
work is for a socially beneficial purpose. Thus, issues of freedom of 
speech are at stake, and expecting users to exactly preempt judges’ 
views about the amount of the work that it is legitimate to take runs the 
risk of chilling that speech.84 This is not to say that courts should pay 
direct attention to human-rights-based arguments in every fair 
use/dealing case (it is argued elsewhere that this is undesirable), but 
rather that courts should bear in mind the context in which their 
decision-making—under sections 29 and 30 of the CDPA and in 17 
U.S.C. § 107—is taking place. As we will see below, this does not 
always happen.  
It is under this consideration that courts most directly need to 
consider whether the use is “necessary,” in the sense that the legitimacy 
of the form of use (e.g., news reporting, parody, etc.) has generally 
already been established and so the question becomes whether the 
extent of the copyright work used is necessary to achieve that purpose. 
Again, this is a slippery question, with the risk being that judges 
substitute their view of what is necessary for that of journalists, 
creatives, etc., in a way that makes it difficult for the latter groups to 
go about their legitimate activities with any degree of certainty about 
how to avoid copyright infringement.  
The dangers of an overly rigid approach to how much of the 
copyright work can be taken for the taking can be fair can be seen 
particularly clearly in the British Hyde Park v. Yelland85and Ashdown 
v. Telegraph86 cases, of which the facts of the latter have already been 
described. In both, one of the important underlying questions was 
whether it was necessary to use the original copyright works 
(respectively, stills from the CCTV camera at Villa Windsor and Paddy 
Ashdown’s minute) in order to communicate the information contained 
therein. In Hyde Park v. Yelland, the Court of Appeal differed from the 
first instance judge’s opinion that “it was close to necessary to publish 
the photographs” to refute statements that Mr. Fayed’s father had made 
elsewhere regarding the length of the stay and, more generally, that “a 
picture says more than a thousand words” and so copying the stills was 
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the most convincing way to prove how long the visit had lasted.87 
Instead, Aldous L.J. held that: 
the extent of the use was excessive. The only part of the 
driveway stills relevant to the alleged purpose was the 
information as to the timing of arrival and departure. That 
information could have been given in the articles by Mr. 
Thompson [the newspaper reporter] stating that he had seen 
the photographs which proved the Princess and Mr. Dodi 
Fayed only stayed at the Villa Windsor for 28 minutes. If he 
needed confirmation he could have relied upon the statement 
by Mr. Cole [the PR director of Mohammed al Fayed’s 
company, who had given the accurate times, though Mr. al 
Fayed had subsequently publicized different timings].88 
In so doing, he was applying the test that he set out—that “the Court 
must judge the fairness by the objective standard of whether a fair 
minded and honest person would have dealt with the copyright work, 
in the manner that The Sun [the defendant’s newspaper] did, for the 
purpose of reporting the relevant current events.” The difficulty is that, 
in reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal differed from the 
journalist’s perception of what was necessary to make the story 
convincing to readers, in the light of significant publicity of a 
countervailing version of events. Clearly, this was not a straightforward 
assessment, given that the first instance judge had also thought that the 
use was necessary.89 
Similarly, in Ashdown v. Daily Telegraph, Lord Phillips M.R. 
noted that “[a] substantial portion of the minute was copied and it is 
reasonable to conclude, for the reasons given by the Vice-Chancellor 
at paragraph 29, that the most important passages in the minute were 
selected for publication” in finding a lack of fair dealing.90 This is a 
somewhat odd point though, in that it would be hard to mount an 
argument that the use was necessary if the unimportant passages were 
included and a piece that did not include the “important passages” 
would not be capable of achieving the objective of reporting current 
events. Lord Phillips goes on to consider whether Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights mandates considerations 
which go further than the conventional fair dealing test. It is here that 
the court considers whether the use of the minute verbatim was 
necessary. Interestingly, it found that it might have been in order to 
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prove that the newspaper had an authentic copy of the minute but that 
the extent to which it was employed here was excessive because it was 
“deliberately filleted in order to extract colourful passages that were 
most likely to add flavour to the article and thus to appeal to the 
readership of the newspaper” and “was for reasons that were essentially 
journalistic in furtherance of the commercial interests of the Telegraph 
Group.”91 Again, it is very tricky to draw a line between what is 
journalistically necessary and what is commercially advantageous, 
particularly as the two will often be in tandem. It is also a false 
dichotomy since we can only have a free press if newspapers are given 
the means to sell newspapers that attract the public.92  
What is striking about both cases is that the Court of Appeal’s 
findings of the extent taken seems to have been infiltrated by alien 
considerations. In Hyde Park, the Court seems to have been particularly 
influenced by the fact that the taking of the copies of the stills were 
unauthorized, while in Ashdown, the Court of Appeal repeatedly refers 
to the fact that, even if the use was justified, the Sunday Telegraph 
could have compensated Mr. Ashdown in order to make the use.93 With 
respect, both seem to distract from the argument of whether it was 
necessary to make the use. If the public was entitled to receive the 
information alleging significant dishonesty in Hyde Park,94 this should 
be the case regardless of how it was obtained. Likewise, compensation 
in Ashdown is a hypothetical argument more suited to legislative 
planning than an actual case, given that a license would have been 
unlikely to have been granted ex ante and compensation ex post in the 
form of damages following litigation would have an obvious chilling 
effect.  
A similarly restrictive approach can be seen in the field of news 
reporting in Harpers & Row. The defendant had copied 300 words 
describing the pardon of Richard Nixon from former U.S. President 
Gerald Ford’s autobiography. The editor of the defendant magazine 
justified the use of verbatim quotes “because simply reciting the 
information could not adequately convey the ‘absolute certainty with 
which [Ford] expressed himself,’ . . . or show that ‘this comes from 
																																								 																				
 91. Id. at [79]-[82]. 
 92. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13. Although there is a countervailing 
question of whether any one copyright owner should need to be the entity that subsides this free 
press.  
 93. See Ashdown [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [68]-[69], [82]. 
 94. On the right to receive information, see Robin E. Herr, The Right to Receive 
Information Under Article 10 of the ECHR: An Investigation from a Copyright Perspective, 
JURIDISKA FÖRENINGEN 193-211 (2011). 
64 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 34 
President Ford,’ . . . or carry the ‘definitive quality’ of the original.”95 
This was used against him though, with the Court stating with implicit 
disapproval: “In short, he quoted these passages precisely because they 
qualitatively embodied Ford’s distinctive expression.”96 It is also 
striking that in measuring the substantiality of what is taken under the 
third factor, the Supreme Court expresses the figure as a percentage of 
the defendant’s work, rather than as a percentage of the copyright 
work.97 This approach seems flawed on the wording of § 107, which 
calls for an analysis “in relation to the copyright work as a whole”98 
and can be expected to have a particularly deleterious effect in relation 
to journalistic articles which are, by their nature, short.  
It is arguable that what drives both this case and Ashdown is the 
prospect of commercial competition with the copyright work. Thus, the 
length of what is taken is not particularly relevant, but rather what 
matters is whether the defendant has taken the “juicy bits.” A similar 
scenario can be seen in ECB,99 where the defendant ran a website 
allowing members of the public to upload eight-second clips from 
sporting events. Expressed as a percentage of a five-day Ashes cricket 
match, eight seconds is infinitesimal.100 However, it was significant 
that it was the highlights of the match that were featured.101 Again, this 
was against a background of the provision of a service that could 
commercially compete with the copyright owner.  
Other cases though have taken a more liberal approach to the 
amount that can be taken for fairness purposes and appear to be guided 
more by the later user’s perception of what is necessary to achieve the 
purpose of criticism, review, or news reporting. Given that both Hyde 
Park and Ashdown are Court of Appeal cases, it is perhaps of greatest 
significance that the Court of Appeal took a less strict approach in Pro 
Sieben.102 The case involved a television program criticizing the 
practice of “chequebook journalism,” including the treatment by the 
press and publicists of Mandy Allwood, a lady who had become 
pregnant with octuplets. The defendant’s television program included 
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a thirty-second clip of Ms. Allwood and her partner visiting a toy shop 
to purchase teddy bears, taken from a German television report which 
was nine minutes long. The Court of Appeal seems to have found this 
aspect of fair dealing relatively easy, finding that the extract was “quite 
short.”103 Consequently, it was not held to compete with the original 
copyright work under the guise of criticism.  
A less strict approach is also evident in the somewhat older Court 
of Appeal case Time Warner v. Channel Four. Channel Four intended 
to broadcast a program about the film A Clockwork Orange, and in 
particular, the decision of its director to withdraw it from circulation in 
the U.K. The program contained clips that amounted to more than eight 
percent of the original copyright film. While this was seen as 
substantial, the Court of Appeal accepted the comment by Channel 
Four’s commissioning editor for the arts that “serious criticism of a 
film requires that you spend sufficient time showing the film itself,”104 
and so the length of the extracts did not prevent there from being fair 
dealing.  
The lower courts have also taken a more relaxed approach, guided 
by what is necessary to achieve the defendant’s purpose. Thus, in 
Fraser-Woodward, which focused inter alia on the relationship 
between Victoria Beckham and the photographer Jason Fraser, Mann 
J. acknowledged that, in including images of Fraser’s photographs, the 
BBC program had taken the entirety of the copyright work. However, 
this was not excessive because any criticism of a photograph is likely 
to require the reproduction of the photograph. Instead, the judge 
considered how long the photographs was featured for, finding that in 
this case they were not “lingering.”105 This sort of approach has 
recently been put on a legislative basis in relation to quotations for 
copyright works, where § 30(1)(A)(c) requires that “the extent of the 
quotation is no more than is required by the specific purpose for which 
it is used” for the defense to apply. It remains to be seen whether courts 
will grant users a margin of appreciation in determining how much is 
needed.106 
Likewise, in more recent U.S. cases, courts tend to take an 
approach to how much can be taken fairly, based on what is necessary 
to achieve the legitimate purpose behind the second use. In Campbell 
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v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court explained that the amount that it is 
necessary to take will depend on the character of the use under the first 
factor and the fourth factor, since a piece that reproduces most of the 
copyright work may be a market substitute.107 Here, the legitimate use 
was parody. For that parody to work, it had to “conjure up” the original, 
which necessitated “quotation of the original’s most distinctive or 
memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience will 
know.” Over and above that, it may also be permissible to take more to 
achieve the objective of making a parody, but not so much that the 
parody is a market substitute. In that case, while the parodist copied the 
bass riff and first line, the rest of its version was composed of its own 
lyrics and sounds and a different drum beat were added, meaning that 
“no more than was necessary” was taken. There is a parallel to be 
drawn here with the CJEU’s Deckmyn case, where the Court found that 
“the concept of ‘parody’, within the meaning of [Article 5(3)(k) of 
Directive 2001/29], is not subject to the conditions that the parody 
should display an original character of its own, other than that of 
displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied 
work.”108 
In some U.S. cases, it has also been recognized that reproducing 
the entirety of the copyright work may be fair. This was the case in 
Sony v. Betamax, though the justification offered for this was viewers 
were just time-shifting what they had already anyway been invited to 
view free of charge, meaning that the case is rather exceptional.109 
However, in more recent years, courts110 have been willing to 
recognize the reproduction of the entirety of copyright works as 
necessary to facilitate the operation of search engines, which are highly 
transformative. Consequently, the fact that the whole work was taken 
did not weigh against fair use. The most prominent example of this is 
the Google Books litigation, where the court noted:  
not only is the copying of the totality of the original 
reasonably appropriate to Google’s transformative purpose, it 
																																								 																				
 107. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 587-89 (1994); Netanel, supra note 46, 
at 745 (“Under the transformative use paradigm, factor three—the amount of the copyrighted 
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 108. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, C-201/13, 2014 E.C.R. 458. 
 109. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). 
 110. See PATRY, supra note 68, § 5.2; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright 
Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 616 (2008) (arguing on the basis of his 
statistical analysis that the courts have placed more emphasis on whether the “heart” of the work 
has been taken, rather than on whether the entirety of the work has been lifted).  
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is literally necessary to achieve that purpose. If Google copied 
less than the totality of the originals, its search function could 
not advise searchers reliably whether their searched term 
appears in a book (or how many times).111  
The greater flexibility of the Court’s approach is also apparent from its 
unwillingness to stop at the bald percentage figures of how much was 
taken, noting that just as important is the order in which they are 
revealed, as this will determine the extent to which the defendant’s 
offering is a substitute. Thus, 16% of the text of a copyright work was 
not considered presumptively unfair112 which seems rather inapposite 
compared to the approach that might have been taken in the past.  
D. Whether the Copyright Work has been Published 
In order to implement the InfoSoc Directive, under § 30(1) of the 
CDPA, the criticism and review defense is only available where the 
work being critiqued has been “made available to the public” since 
2003. There is no such statutory restriction in relation to news 
reporting113 or parody.114 Nevertheless, in analyzing whether use is fair 
dealing, for many years, judges have considered whether the work in 
question has been published. Thus, in British Oxygen, a case dating 
from 1925, Romer J. found that “it would be manifestly unfair that an 
unpublished literary work should, without the consent of the author, be 
the subject of public criticism, review or newspaper summary. Any 
such dealing with an unpublished literary work would not, therefore, in 
my opinion, be a ‘fair dealing’ with the work.”115 Requiring works to 
be published to benefit from the defense seems particularly 
undesirable, given that the fair dealing defense would be the first resort 
for “whistleblowers” hoping to publish copyright information that the 
authors would prefer to remain secret. It also allows authors to control 
information by “cherry picking” what to release to the public. On the 
other hand though, as an author, the thought of having endless “first 
drafts” that have ultimately been reworked being publicly critiqued is 
																																								 																				
 111. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphases added). 
 112. Id. at 223.  
 113. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30(2) (Eng.). 
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already familiar with the source material.  
 115. British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Liquid Air Ltd. [1925] Ch 383 at 393 (Eng.). Somewhat 
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a disquieting one, particularly as discarded drafts may not accurately 
reflect the views and standards of the author.  
 The overinclusiveness of the no unpublished works position was 
recognized in Beloff v. Pressdram,116 where the judge doubted whether 
Romer J. could have meant that unpublished work should be 
“automatically” outside the fair dealing provisions, rather than an 
“important factor.”117 Nevertheless, the basis of the decision that there 
was no fair dealing in Beloff v. Pressdram, which involved a memo 
from the political editor of the Observer newspaper to her editor 
describing a discussion with a cabinet minister about the next prime 
minister if the incumbent was run over by a bus, was that it was 
“unpublished and indeed it was never intended to be published.”118 
More recently, the fact that the minute had not been published 
contributed to the finding of no fair dealing in Ashdown v. 
Telegraph.119 
It should be noted though that measures short of publication by 
the author may remove the problem of the work being unpublished, if 
the result is that the information contained therein becomes public 
knowledge. Thus, in Hubbard v. Vosper, Lord Denning found that 
while Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard’s writings had not formally 
been published, the same effect may be present where a work has been 
“circulated to such a wide circle that it is ‘fair dealing’ to criticize it 
publicly in a newspaper, or elsewhere.”120 On the other hand, the fact 
that the ideas as opposed to the expression are already in circulation 
may mitigate against fair dealing. Thus, in Ashdown v. Telegraph, one 
of the reasons why there was no fair dealing was much of the 
information in the minute was already public, so there was not the same 
need to use the memo itself.121 
In the background to this group of cases are arguably two 
underlying concerns.122 First, the way in which the published works 
																																								 																				
 116. Nora Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd. [1973] R.P.C. 765 at 786-78 (Eng.).  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 787.  
 119. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.). 
 120. Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (Eng.). 
 121. See Ashdown [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [74] (Eng.). 
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infringed his right to be the first to publish the deciphered text”. As our discussions in relation to 
market harm have shown, this will generally only be accepted where a strong countervailing 
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have reached the defendants often involves some form of suspect 
activity, or even theft and dishonesty. This is difficult, because such 
practices are often part and parcel of whistleblowing. Secondly, where 
the reason that the work is unpublished is that the author has plans to 
release it at a later date, this interferes with the copyright owner’s 
ability to market his work. 
In the U.S. too, lack of publication has historically played a 
significant role in determining whether the use is fair. In Harper & Row 
v. Nation,123 the Supreme Court found, by reference to the legislative 
history of the 1976 Copyright Act that “the unpublished nature of a 
work is “[a] key, though not necessarily determinative, factor“ tending 
to negate a defense of fair use.” The Court identifies the potential 
interests at stake as both privacy and the commercial interest of giving 
the author the right to choose when he will publish. This implicates the 
author’s persona interest in creative control, his property interest in 
exploiting the work and the benefit to the public of enabling authors 
the time to develop their ideas free from expropriation. 
 The decision was applied in Salinger v. Random House, a case 
concerning a bibliography extracting letters written by J.D. Salinger 
and donated to various university libraries. These letters were 
considered to be unpublished and so, following Harper & Row, the 
Court of Appeals found that the nature of the copyright work factor 
weighed heavily in favor of the author. The Salinger court understood 
Harper & Row to mean that “such [unpublished] works normally enjoy 
complete protection against copying any protected expression.”124 The 
impact of this decision was undone though by a legislative amendment 
to § 107 in 1992, to add a statement that reads: “The fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors.” Thus, whether the 
copyright work has been published remained a consideration, but not a 
determinative one.125  
What is striking is that both the U.S. and the U.K. have both taken 
a hardline approach to fairness in cases involving unpublished 
works.126 While the position in both jurisdictions has evolved from 
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 123. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985). 
 124. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).  
 125. For examples of cases where this has been applied, see PATRY, supra note 68, at § 4.2. 
See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the 
Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1999).  
 126. Although, in the U.K., the unpublished nature often seems to have shut down the fair 
dealing inquiry, while Beebe finds in the U.S. that while the unpublished nature was often 
considered, it was outweighed by the other factors, and in fact what happened was that the fact 
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effectively allowing no use of such works to allowing use, but only in 
limited circumstances, it is still surprising that this factor has 
effectively been allowed to trump the need for the user to access this 
information to convey messages that are frequently in the public 
interest. What is even more striking is that the courts tend, in their 
decision making, to highlight the interests that would be put at risk by 
allowing the use of unpublished works without considering the 
countervailing interests of the public in receiving that information.   
E. Whether the Author/Owner has been Acknowledged 
A further way in which uses may be deemed not to be fair is if the 
user fails to acknowledge the original copyright owner. In the U.K. 
acknowledgement is a separate statutory requirement, rather than part 
of the fairness analysis. Thus, fair dealing for the purposes of non-
commercial research,127 for criticism and review,128 “for illustration 
for instruction,”129 and “for reporting current events”130 must be 
accompanied by “sufficient acknowledgement,” unless this is 
“impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise.”131 However, no 
acknowledgement is required for parodies, caricatures, or pastiches, 
presumably in recognition of how parodies are usually presented to the 
public132 or for private study.133 Sufficient acknowledgement is 
defined as:  
an acknowledgement identifying the work in question by its 
title or other description, and identifying the author unless—  
in the case of a published work, it is published anonymously;  
in the case of an unpublished work, it is not possible for a 
person to ascertain the identity of the author by reasonable 
inquiry.134 
In practice, the courts in the U.K. have been relatively liberal in their 
construction of what counts as acknowledgement. Thus, in Pro Sieben, 
the use of the logo of the TV channel that had conducted the interview 
																																								 																				
that the work was published weighed in favor of fair use. Beebe, supra note 110, at 612-15. 
 127. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30 (Eng.)  
 128. Id. at § 30(1).  
 129. Id. at § 32(1)(c).  
 130. Id. at § 30(2).  
 131. Id. at §29(1B) (research); id. at § 30(1) (criticism and review); id. at § 30(3) (news 
reporting, but only in relation to the use of sound recordings, films, and broadcasts).  
 132. Id. § 30A; see Griffiths, supra note 32, at 4. 
 133. Id. § 29(1C) (private study).  
 134. Id. at § 178.  
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featured sufficed.135 The full name of the TV channel did not need to 
be used, and the name did not need to be spoken. This was taken further 
by Arnold J. in ECB v. Tixdaq, a case involving the uploading of a large 
number of clips of cricket matches, who accepted in principle that if 
the logo had been included in some of the clips from that day, a 
reasonable user would appreciate that all the footage from that day 
came from the same source, and so just including the logo on some of 
the clips was sufficient acknowledgement.136 Likewise, in Newspaper 
Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, the name of the 
newspaper, rather than the name of the publisher of the newspaper was 
sufficient.137 A similarly relaxed approach can be seen in Fraser-
Woodward, where Mann J. found that acknowledgement need not be 
express: 
All that is required is that it is an identification, though I think 
that I can accept that it probably has to be one that can readily 
be seen and not require some form of hunting around or 
detective work . . . . It is probably not enough to say that the 
author can be identified if you look hard enough; the 
authorship must be more apparent than that.  
. . . 
I do not think that the concept of identification means that 
there has to be a precisely or virtually contemporaneous act of 
identification. Once the identification has been provided then 
it is capable of operating in relation to a later appearance of 
the copyright material.138 
Thus, panning down to the author credits at the bottom of a photograph 
sufficed.139 
Acknowledgement (or attribution as it is more likely to be known 
across the Atlantic) has little formal role to play in the U.S. fairness 
analysis. The concept of attribution comes with baggage in the U.S. 
context, given its overlapping content with the moral right of 
attribution. However, Cameron140 points to a number of decisions 
where attribution has been considered by the courts as part of the fair 
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use analysis. She cites a handful of cases: Rogers v. Koons;141 Karll v. 
Curtis Publishing Co.;142 Henry Holt & Co. v. Leggett & Myers 
Tobacco Co.;143 and Feiner v. HR Industries.144 
Roger v. Koons145 involved the creation of a wooden sculpture 
based on a photograph of two people holding a number of puppies 
while sitting on a bench. The defendant, artist Jeff Koons, found this 
image on a postcard. His fair use argument was rejected in part because 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals used the fact that he had torn the 
copyright details off the notecard as evidence that the purpose and 
character of his use under the first fact was the bad faith exploitation of 
the copyright work for personal gain. Thus, lack of attribution militated 
against fair use, although it should be remembered that this case 
predates Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,146 and there is a good chance 
that the artistic context may have resulted in this case being decided 
differently today, given the transformative use doctrine. In Feiner v. 
HR Industries, the lack of attribution of the photograph in question 
could lead the public to think that it was in the public domain, reducing 
the photograph’s ability to extract royalties.147 
On the other hand, the fact that attribution was present favored 
fair use in Karll v. Curtis. The defendant, in an article about the Green 
Bay Packers Football team, reproduced the copyright-protected team 
song. Here, there was fair use in part because the author of the song 
was acknowledged.148 
Yet another approach is evidence in Henry Holt v. Ligget & 
Myers.149 The defendant copied an extract from an earlier copyright 
scientific book in its pamphlet designed to demonstrate that cigarettes 
are not harmful. The author of the book was identified in the pamphlet 
by the defendant, and he argued that a link to such a commercial 
context would be harmful to his reputation. Again, fair use was 
rejected.  
Although the argument is an intriguing one, it is hard to say that 
this small number of cases over a fifty-year period and all saying 
slightly different things constitutes compelling evidence of the 
relevance of attribution in the U.S. context. Indeed, as Cameron herself 
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 149. Henry Holt & Co., 23 F. Supp. at 304.  
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observes,150 the Supreme Court has never given a role to attribution, so 
much so that in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,151 the Court observed that 
defendants had attributed the original rights of “Oh, Pretty Woman” 
but then failed to connect this to its fair use analysis.  
F. Human Rights 
Human rights can occasionally act as an adjunct to the fairness 
defenses. Enforcing copyright means suppressing speech. While 
freedom of speech is a human right protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights,152 European153 and common law 
principles, and constitutionally-protected in the U.S.,154 copyright is 
also designed to stimulate speech and so an overly aggressive approach 
to allowing third-party speech in this area runs the risk that the very 
speech that we wish to share is dampened. It should also be 
remembered that copyright is a form of property, and the enjoyment of 
property is also protected as a human right.155 Thus, human rights-
based references to freedom of speech tend only to be directly 
determinative of when use is fair in exceptional cases.  
It is sometimes argued that free speech cannot have a role to play 
here because copyright only protects expression and others are free to 
use the ideas communicated therein. Leaving aside the fuzziness of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, it should be noted that free speech case law 
holds that, on occasion at least, it is crucial that parties be able to use 
exact words to make their point. The U.K. must heed the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in Fressoz v. France. 
The issue there was whether Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights required that the journalists in question be allowed to 
publish the tax return of a prominent French businessman. The Court 
found that:  
In essence, that Article leaves it for journalists to decide 
whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to 
ensure credibility. It protects journalists’ rights to divulge 
information on issues of general interest provided that they 
are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and 
																																								 																				
 150. Cameron, supra note 140, at 142.  
 151. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573.  
 152. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 220 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. 
 153. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11, 2010 O.J. C 364/08. 
[hereinafter European Charter of Rights].  
 154. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 155. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 152, at protocol 1, art. 1.; 
European Charter of Rights, supra note 153, at art. 7; U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with 
the ethics of journalism.156 
This suggests that journalists should be given a significant margin of 
appreciation in determining whether it is necessary to use an original 
document, or just the information contained therein. While the claim in 
Fressoz was that the tax return had been published in breach of 
confidence, rather than infringement of copyright, it has been 
suggested157 that the same principle should apply where the proposed 
interference with speech is from copyright. The discretion given under 
Article 10 to journalists in choosing how to frame their articles and 
which documents to include is not without limit though, as is apparent 
from Bédat v. Switzerland.158 There, the journalist had included 
transcripts of police interviews with a man who had ploughed his car 
into a number of pedestrians, and then attempted to drive off a bridge, 
as well as statements from his wife, his doctor, and letters he wrote to 
the judge. The journalist had then been prosecuted under a Swiss law 
preventing the publication of secret official deliberations. The Court 
reiterated the fact that Article 10 protects “not only the substance of the 
ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are 
conveyed” and that it was “not for this Court, or for the national courts 
for that matter, to substitute their own views for those of the press as to 
what reporting technique should be adopted by journalists.”159 
However, the ECHR found that this prosecution, while an interference 
with speech, was necessary and proportionate given the sensationalist 
way that the article was written,160 and the countervailing interests of 
protecting the administration of justice161 and the accused’s private 
life.162 Thus, there are two reasons why the use of the expression was 
not appropriate here: (i) the way it was used and (ii) the importance of 
the countervailing right. It would be interesting to see the relative 
weight the court would grant to the protection of copyright, which is 
after all recognized as giving rise to a human right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of property, but it is suggested that the outcome would be 
closer to Fressoz than Bédat.  
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 160. Id. at ¶ 60. 
 161. Id. at ¶¶ 68-71.  
 162. Id. at ¶¶ 72-78.  
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Analogously in the U.S., but outside the journalistic context, the 
Supreme Court in Cohen v. California recognized that the First 
Amendment protects expression, as well as ideas. Cohen’s crime was 
his presence in the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a t-shirt 
which said on it “FUCK THE DRAFT,” a reference to his views on the 
Vietnam War. He was convicted of disturbing the peace, despite the 
fact that he had not acted in any way violently. While Cohen could have 
communicated his disapproval of the draft using other language, the 
Supreme Court, in overturning his conviction noted: 
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative 
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively 
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible 
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for 
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the 
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive 
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that 
emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the 
more important element of the overall message sought to be 
communicated.163 
Nevertheless, even free speech advocates counsel caution on 
overreliance on human rights arguments in the copyright context, given 
that the law has an built-in balancing mechanism judged appropriate 
by the legislator in the form of the fair use/dealing provisions. Thus, 
according to Barendt: 
[f]reedom of expression challenges to the enforcement of 
copyright should only be sustained when copyright law is 
used to suppress the dissemination of information of real 
importance to the public or to stifle artistic creativity, parody 
or satire. . . . The provision of “fair dealing” and other 
defenses should not preclude an argument that copyright 
enforcement infringes “freedom of speech” but a court can 
properly require the infringer to provide strong reasons why it 
should disregard the balance between the rights struck by the 
legislation.164 
It should also be noted that overreliance on constitutional arguments is 
in itself undesirable, and it is simpler for parties all around if the 
concerns are worked into the legislatively-created balance between IPR 
holders and users’ rights which are worked into the legislation.165  
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On the whole, this balancing happens.166 However, on rare 
occasions, the courts have been prepared to entertain human rights 
arguments. These tend to be dealt with as an “add-on” argument to fair 
dealing, rather than as part of the fair dealing balance. Thus, in 
Ashdown, the Court of Appeal considered the impact of the Human 
Rights Act after its normal fair dealing analysis, and ultimately decided 
that both doctrines led to the same result.167  
In the U.S., the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft168 noted that 
speech is generally adequately protected under copyright law: the 
idea/expression dichotomy protects the communication of ideas and 
fair use means that, in certain circumstances, the expression itself can 
be used. Whether there really is a conflict between copyright and the 
First Amendment of course depends on the assumption that the 
boundaries of these doctrines are clear and appropriately drawn, though 
it is worth noting that in recent years, the rise of transformative use, 
together with the lessened importance of the market harm factor, means 
that fair use has a greater scope. It should be noted though that some 
scholars feel that the rise in transformative use has limited free speech 
by privileging “rebels” at the expense for pure copying for socially 
beneficial purposes, such as educational use.169  
CONCLUSION 
Although it is clear that both the U.S. and the U.K. use similar 
factors to determine whether the use of another’s copyright work is 
“fair,” it is equally apparent that they place different weights on the 
different factors. This is the case, even if each factor is examined in 
isolation; the two jurisdictions have, at least in some point in time, 
adopted a similar approach. This is particularly true in relation to harm 
to the market, and in relation the amount of work taken, as well as prior 
publication, where both jurisdictions historically have engaged in quite 
similar analyses, and if anything, in the past, the U.S. has adopted a 
stricter approach. However, it is argued that ultimately what has made 
the biggest difference between the U.S. and U.K. approach is indeed 
the closed-versus-open list. This is not so much because of the 
structural difference between standards and rules. Rather, in the U.S., 
the open list has led to the development of the transformative use 
																																								 																				
 166. See Griffiths, supra note 19, at 174 (describing free speech as “a background principle 
which supports the fair dealing provisions”). 
 167. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [78]-[83]. See also HRH 
Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2008] Ch 57 [179].  
 168. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003). 
 169. Tushnet, supra note 47.  
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doctrine under the first factor. This has “swamped” the other key 
factors of market harm and necessity of use, which still play a key role 
in the U.K. Once a use has been found to be so strongly in favor of the 
public’s interest, it is difficult for the court to constrain it. On the other 
hand, in the U.K., this discussion is predetermined by what is on the 
“closed list,” leaving more room for a stricter approach to the other 
factors. As has been mentioned above, there is an interesting contrast 
between Authors Guild170 in the U.S. and ECB v. Tixdaq171 in the U.K.: 
the finding of social value of Google Books’ services paved the way 
for a finding that copying the entirety of the works was permissible, 
while in ECB, the step-by-step analysis resulted in a finding that eight-
second clips were excessive and harmed a market that was yet to be 
properly exploited. It seems that perhaps former Prime Minister David 
Cameron was right after all . . . 172 
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